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Smallpox:
Local Epidemics and the Iowa State
Board of Health, 1880-1900
PHILIP L. FRANA
Our School Board has refused to issue an order compelling all
children attending the public schools to be vaccinated . . . claim-
ing that there is no law for the same, and that they can resort to
no compulsory measures in this respect. Holding a different opin-
ion, that the order should be issued as a sanitary and precau-
tionary measure, I desire to obtain the decision of State Board.
. . . If I am wrong, what action should be taken?
—Dr. Charles H. Lathrop, Lyons, Iowa
Have we the authority as a local board of health to enforce vac-
cination? We have passed an ordinance to that effect, as we have
variola near us.
—Dr. M. Y Baker, Fayette, Iowa
Small-pox eight miles east of here. People passing. What shall I
do? AjTswer
—Dr. M. T. Martin, Woodbum, Iowa'
IOWA'S INAUGURATION of a State Board of Health in 1880
introduced Iowa communities, railroads, and health care pro-
viders to a new source of potential support in the battie against
smallpox. By promising to rid towns of scourges of diseases that
had agitated citizens since territorial days, board physicians
1. State Board of Health, Biennial Report 2 (1883), 12,17; Ibid. 4 (1887), 49.
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pledged to win a war against a whole host of "specific febrile
diseases/' including scarlet fever, diphtheria, and smallpox.
Unlike the midwestem metropolises—Chicago, Milwaukee,
and St. Louis—most Iowa towns lacked highly organized health
boards throughout the nineteenth century. Responding to each
epidemic of disease, Iowa towns formed boards ad hoc and
organized relief efforts both to stem the tide of disease and to
protect the local economy. Physicians of the State Board of
Health quickly learned to use efforts to control smallpox as a
way to introduce autonomous municipal and business interests
to the potential benefits of centralized public health.^
Armed with knowledge gained from nearly a century of
experiments in fighting the disease, the board made vaccina-
tion, quarantine, and reporting of the disease centerpieces of its
activities. With the sanction of a National Board of Health, the
Iowa State Board also advanced regulations directed at interstate
passenger railroad cars and the diseases thought to be harbored
within. For the remainder of the century, smallpox prevention
and control was seen by both physicians and lay people as the
most powerful weapon in the board's arsenal. Although of
dubious effect, the efforts made by the Iowa State Board of
Health to rid rural communities of smallpox served, to some
extent, to supplement the actions of local authorities, who
sought to protect their communities not only from smallpox,
but from immigrants and economic ruin as well.
SINCE COLONIAL TIMES local health boards had been
formed to ameliorate the ill effects of American urban life.
Visitors and residents alike often noted the apparent sickliness
2. Robert H. Wiebe has suggested in The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New
York, 1967), xiii, that the United States as a whole acted as a system of isolated
"island communities" for much of the nineteenth century, largely because of
poor communication links between cities. A fascinating narrative of the role
of the State Board of Health as a flash point for medical reform in Iowa is in
Lee Anderson, "'Headlights upon Sanitary Medicine': Public Health and Medi-
cal Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Iowa," journal of the History of Medicine
and Allied Sciences 46 (1991), 178-200. For a discussion of the movement from
local to regional and national control over matters of public health, corisult
Alan I Marcus, "Disease Prevention in America: From a Local to a National
Outlook, 1880-1910," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 53 (1979), 184-203.
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of exploding seaboard populations. Immigrants, besides bringing
strange languages and habits, also brought exotic diseases that
threatened to lay waste to America's capitalist experiment.
Throughout the nineteenth century, sanitation, which in the
mid-nineteenth century meant controlling the environmental
factors that caused disease, was a chief worry of these local
boards. Most diseases were believed to arise spontaneously from
rotting garbage and other effluvia—that is, unless you were a
contagionist, in which case you blamed "morbific poisons" or
explained disease in terms of chemical reactions.^
Smallpox, though, was regarded by most as a spedal case.
Although it was generally considered an atmospheric pollutant
or organic poison like other diseases, quantifiable evidence was
accumulating indicating that smallpox could be prevented. Be-
fore Edward Jenner developed his vaccination in 1796, a case
of smallpox inevitably ended with either death or lifetime im-
munity. A confluent case, with oozing pustules carpeting the
body, was one of the most hideous afflictions of human history.
Vaccination and the proliferation after 1890 of a more benign
strain of the virus called Variola minor with very low mortality
(less than 1 percent) and immunity-conferring properties had
changed the nature of the threat from the disease. Like a tiger
caught in a trap, perennial waves of the disease, regarded as
rights of passage for infants and the young, were stopped in
their tracks as millions worldwide benefited from the limited
protection of the cowpox vaccine.*
By the last quarter of the century, however, the tiger had
escaped. Epidemics, often of the milder V. minor strain, were
showing up again in the immigrant quarters of eastem cities,
and subsequently reappeared in the Midwest. A new generation
was not being immunized as quickly as the last. Some people,
harboring an artificial sense of security, flatly refused to accept
vaccination. Others felt that the danger posed by vaccination
3. Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment,
Í880-1980 (College Station, TX, 1981), 3-15; Charles V. Chapin, "History of
State and Municipal Control of Disease," in A Half Century of Public Health,
ed. Mazyck P. Ravenel (New York, 1921), 136-38.
4. Alfred W. Crosby, "Smallpox," in The Cambridge World History of Human
Disease, ed. Kenneth F. Kiple (Cambridge, 1993), 1008-9, 1012.
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outweighed the threat from the disease itself. A banker from
Nora Springs, Iowa, led the opposition with an ill-conceived
nationwide antivaccination organization.^
Despite opposition and indifference toward attempts to
orgarüze a systematic response to epidetnics, municipal health
boards inched their way into the American experience after the
Civil War, alternately appearing and disappearing as crises
came and went. Chicago created its first local board in 1867 in
response to a pandemic of cholera, but when the crisis passed,
the organization nearly collapsed. Chicago's experience was
mirrored in many urban areas both large and small. During
epidemics, cities created ad hoc boards composed of a mixture
of physicians, elected officials, school board members, ministers,
and other commmiity leaders. They issued and enforced munici-
pal edicts, whether promulgated in code or not. Only a handful
of midwestem cities, including the Iowa towns of Keokuk and
Dubuque, had boards of health that were articulated duties of
county trustees, mayors, and physicians. Even there, though,
board activities were often neglected except in times of emer-
gency. In general, these local boards' effectiveness in rallying
citizens was uneven at best. Often their success depended on
the sensational power of the press, which unfortunately also
had an irritating tendency to magnify anxiety despite claims to
the contrary.*
In response to the need for more expansive control over
teeming immigrant cities, state boards of health had been pro-
posed for several of the more populous eastem states beginning
in the mid-nineteenth century. Lemuel Shattuck's Report of the
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts (1850) became the manifesto
for late nineteenth-century American health reform, although
nearly two decades would pass before the first state boards were
created following his recommendations. During that time,
Shattuck lectured widely in the East about the pressing need
5. Phyllis Allen Richmond, "American Attitudes toward the Germ Theory of
Disease (1860-1880)," Journal of the History of Medicine 9 (1954), 42B-31. See
also Martin Kaufman, "The American AnH-Vaccinationists and Their Argu-
ments," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 41 (1967), 463-78.
6. Chapin, "History of State and Municipal Control of Disease," 136-38.
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to coordinate public health activities on a grander scale in order
to n\eet sanitary and pestilential challenges. Shattuck's central
contention was that niean life expectancy in the United States
had actually decreased while that of health-reforming Europe
was increasing by leaps and bounds during the century. To
improve American health he advised states to devise uniform
classification of causes of death, provide health education, and
vaccinate the populace. Although Shattuck's work was ignored
by his contemporaries, his ideas were pointedly recast in legis-
lation establishing state boards in Massachusetts (1869) and,
ironically, in the western states of California (1870), Minnesota
(1872), Wisconsin (1876), Illinois (1877), and Iowa (1880).^
IN THE LATE 1870s members of the Iowa State Medical So-
ciety, drawing on their growing sense of professionalism and
"pride as public spirited citizens of a growing commonwealth,"
began lobbying the state legislature for the creation of a State
Board of Health. On March 26,1880, the legislature gave final
approval for an Act to Establish a State Board of Health. The
board was to be composed of nine individuals—the Iowa attor-
ney general, a dvil engineer, and seven physicians—all appointed
by the governor. The physicians were appointed to staggered
terms of seven years, one physician being replaced each year.
The legislature allotted five thousand dollars to run the board,
including a comfortable twelve hundred dollars for the secre-
tary. Modeled after the Illinois state board, the Iowa board was
charged with the responsibility of supervising matters related
to the health and welfare of Iowa's residents. Specifically, the
board's activities were to include acting as the "medical police"
7. Lemuel Shattuck, Report ofthe Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts, 1850
(1850; reprint, Cambridge, MA, 1948), v-ix; Chapín, "History of State and
Municipal Control of Disease," 138-39; Barbara Gutmann Rosenkrantz, Public
Health and the State: Changing Views in Massachusetts, 1842-1936 (Cambridge,
MA, 1972), 22. For the institution of other community and state boards of
health, see Judith Walzer Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and the Politics
of Health Reform (Princeton, NJ, 1982); John Duffy, A History of Public Health
in New York City, 1866-1966, 2 vols. (New York, 1974); Isaac D. Rawlings, The
Rise and Fall of Disease in Illinois (Springfield, IL, 1927); and James H. Cassedy,
Charles V. Chapin and the Public Health Movement (Cambridge, MA, 1962).
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for physicians, providing a forum for advances in public health,
mobilizing local organizations to control epidemic outbreaks,
and collecting statistics on disease.^
The law assigned various responsibilities to the board, but
lacked meaningful provisions for enforcement. For example, the
legislature included sections in the state code requiring that
physicians and midwives register with the county clerk of court
to ensure accurate and complete health reporting to the board.
A ten-dollar penalty was to be assessed for failure to report
deaths to the clerk of court within thirty days of their occur-
rence. But enforcement was an unpaid extension of court clerks'
duties, so the system remained weak. As a result, death records
for the late nineteenth century are frustratingly inaccurate and
unsystematic. In fact, poor recording by court clerks and delays
in gathering the data prompted the state board to encourage
health and medical authorities to report significant outbreaks
of disease directly to the board's offices in Des Moines by tele-
graph. In practice, the board's activities were limited largely to
suggesting quarantines where appropriate; collecting some sta-
tistical information on births, deaths, and marriages; and inves-
tigating hazardous sanitary conditions.^
The importance of smallpox prevention in the Iowa State
Board of Health's plan of attack is indicated by the dispropor-
tionate number of pages in the board's biennial reports given
over to discussion of the nature and spread of smallpox. The
mortality rate from smallpox was relatively insignificant com-
8. D. S. Fairchild, "A Brief History of the Iowa State Board of Health," Journal
of the Iowa State Medical Society 4 (1914), 467; Laws of Iowa (1880), chap. 151;
Annotated Code of Iowa (1897), sec. 4977-78,4998. The board for a time included
among its membership two homeopaths and an eclectic. By 1890, Iowa's eclec-
tic and homeopathic practitioners were generally absorbed into the mainstream
of Iowa medicine provided they severed their overt ties to sectarian organiza-
tions. See William G. Rothstein, "The Botanical Movement and Orthodox
Medicine," in Other Healers: Unorthodox Medicine in America, ed. Norman Gevitz
(Baltimore, 1988), 47-50; Martin Kaufman, "Homeopathy in America: The Rise
and Fall and Persistence of a Medical Heresy," ibid., 99-101,105; Anderson,
'"Headlights upon Sanitary Medicine,'" 187.
9. Laws of Iowa (1880), chap. 151. Not until 1923 did Iowa gain admittance to
the National Death Registration System formed in 1880 to improve and
systematize the death certification proœss.
Smallpox 93
pared to all other epidemic or "zymotic" diseases present in
Iowa at the time, including diphtheria, scarlet fever, and tuber-
culosis. Between 1800 and 1900, nearly 20 percent of all deaths
involved epidemic diseases. Tuberculosis accounted for about
10 percent of those deaths caused by epidemic diseases, diph-
theria 3 percent, and smallpox less than 0.5 percent. Still, the
board's reports were dominated by the discussion of issues
related to smallpox.'"
There is no "representative" or average smallpox epidemic
in Iowa in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The
yearly tally of cases fluctuated widely. Furthermore, records are
available only on a county by county basis, making it difficult
to follow epidemics, which have no respect for political bound-
aries. Still, some general observations on the nature and extent
of smallpox in Iowa are possible. First, smallpox was not en-
demic to the state; all cases of the disease reported in the state
were imported. Second, epidemics in Iowa during these years
burned themselves out within months as the susceptible human
reservoir was quickly exhausted. By nature, smallpox requires
a dense and vulnerable human population to sustain itself.
Only a few midwestem cities—Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis,
and perhaps Omaha—had the population density to sustain
smallpox. Apparently, Iowa's rural character gave smallpox no
foothold for permanent establishment. Thus, for some years
between 1880 and 1900, few cases were reported to the board,
while other years witnessed a flurry of cases (see table).
In sum, the number of cases and their risk appears singu-
larly unremarkable, even in light of the underreporting of epi-
10. The very first Biennial Report, published in 1881, contained twelve ref-
erences to smallpox and vaccination, compared with ten to scarlet fever, two
to measles, one to dysentery, and one to cholera. Only diphtheria evoked
similar treatment, with eleven references. The next volume listed 26 references
to smallpox, 14 to scarlet fever, and 9 to diphtheria. Even at the end of the
century, when tuberculosis began to menace the health of Iowans, the Biennial
Report gave more than 56 pages to smallpox versus 33 to consumption. State
Board of Health, Biennial Report 1 (1881), 333-46 (hereafter cited as Biennial
Report); ibid. 2 (1883), 403-417; ibid. 5 (1889), 191. In all, the Biennial Reports
published between 1881 and 1901 devoted 227 pages to smallpox and vaccina-
tion; 98 pages described quarantine procedures. I computed causes of death
from a random sampling of entries in county death registers in Iowa.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SMALLPOX CASES IN IOWA
REPORTED TO THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH, 1881-1901
Year Cases Year Cases
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886-87
1888-89
85
n.a.
596
35
59
74
51
1890
1891-93
1894-95
1896-97
1898
1899
1900-1901
n.a.
3
117
4
249
646
4148
SOURCE; Iowa State Board of Health, Biennial Reports, 1881-1901.
demie diseases. The rate of morbidity was low, ranging from
about 2 to 100 cases per 100,000 yearly. Approximately 75 per-
cent of all epidemics reported to the State Board of Health
between 1880 and 1900 involved fewer than 20 individuals; 15
percent involved between 20 and 50 cases; and only 10 percent
more than fifty. The three largest epidemics in Iowa during this
period—all between 1899 and 1901 —resulted in a total of 1,042
cases. In each of the three "worst" epidemics, the affliction was
described as more like chicken pox in its character than like the
killer of previous centuries. Natural attenuation of the virus,
rather than any specific medical or hygienic treatment, was
likely responsible for the weakened effect of the virus."
Nonetheless, Iowans perceived smallpox to be more prev-
alent and more dangerous than it actually was. Much of this
misconception can be explained by the terrible sight of the
victims and the lightning nature of its spread. Iowa press head-
lines trumpeting lurid tales of smallpox epidemics in faraway
places, such as Great Britain and Asia, also had their effect. In
addition, Iowans' dread of smallpox had as much to do with
fears of economic and social dislocation caused by immigrants
and their diseases as it did with the possible adverse health
effects of the disease. These considerations, however, did not
11. Raw data from the Biennial Reports, 1881-1901.
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MAP
LOCATIONS OF SERIOUS OUTBREAKS
OF SMALLPOX IN IOWA, 1880-1901
ibuque
Kiokuk
diminish the real threat epidemics of smallpox posed for those
who lived in its shadow.
Tracing the course of local epidemics of smallpox in Keokuk,
rural Worth County, and Fremont County illustrates the evolv-
ing relationship between the State Board of Health and local
boards, both of whom had to take into account local economic
interests. As city business faltered during Keokuk's bizarre
1882 smallpox epidemic, the new state board aid offered no aid.
Several years later. Worth County boards accepted help from
the state board to counteract the threat from immigrants and
travelers. In 1898-99 Fremont County officials were more in-
terested in blasting the failure of Nebraska City physicians to
quarantine exposed individuals who brought the disease across
the river, wreaking havoc on local trade. Nebraska City in turn
blamed the economic powerhouse of Omaha for disrupting its
own commerce. The Chicago & North Western epidemic of 1889
reveals the threat posed by high-speed transportation systems
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and their passengers. In protecting their communities from dis-
ease, lowans' xenophobic reaction to the immigrants and other
strangers carried by the railroads reflects, to some extent, what
historian Alan M. Kraut has recently termed the "double helix
of health and fear." The state board certainly did not solve the
economic, immigrant, or jurisdictional problems created by out-
breaks of disease but became, rather, a new player troubled by
the same ^^
THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC in Iowa
after the establishment of the State Board of Health occurred in
Keokuk, ironically the site of Iowa's oldest and largest medical
school and the hometown of the president of the Iowa State Med-
ical Society. This 1882 epidemic, which made national headlines,
began when a student nicked himself with a scalpel drawn from
a smallpox-infected cadaver. In all, seventy-one cases were re-
ported to the State Board of Health, with nine confirmed deaths.'^
Keokuk in 1882 was better prepared than most cities to
wage a war against smallpox and other pestilential diseases.
Occupying a low-lying area at the confluence of the Mississippi
and Des Moines Rivers, Keokuk had experience in previous
decades with malaria, cholera, and yellow fever epidemics that
spread along the Mississippi River. Keokuk had a well-worn
pest house—a small wooden shack—on the outskirts of town
where individuals with smallpox, malaria, and other afflictions
were isolated. Medical facilities beyond the ramshackle pest
house were far in advance of others in the state, with the pos-
sible exception of the recently established medical department
12. Alan M. Kraut, Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace"
(New York, 1994), 9.
13. Hannibal Courier, reprinted in the Keokuk Constitution, 12 January 1882;
Keokuk Weekly Gate City, 2 February 1882; New York Times, 6 January 1882.
Local newspaper clippings related to the smallpox epidemic are conveniently
collected in the R. J. Bickel Notebook Collection, a topical collection of news-
paper clippings on the history of Keokuk. The original notebook is held at the
Lee County, Iowa Historical Society, Keokuk. A microfilm copy is held at the
State Historical Society of Iowa, Des Moines. The portion dealing with the
smallpox epidemic is on reel 4, pp. 55-65. This epidemic, perhaps because of
its novelty, is the most fully documented of the four described here.
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at the State University in Iowa City. The Keokuk College of
Physicians and Surgeons, a 250-bed facility expanded during
the Civil War with financial support from the federal govem-
ment, was one of the largest hospitals west of the Mississippi.
Hundreds of medical students boarded locally in private resi-
dences when classes were in session. And only two years before
the epidemic the coUege had graduated its largest class in his-
tory, 221 expectant practitioners. Thus the town had a ready
supply of physicians and students willing to practice their arts
on the local inhabitants."
Keokuk's experience with infectious crew and passengers
on riverboats and its well-established medical community pro-
vided little guidance, however, when smallpox broke out in
town on Christmas Day, 1881. By January 6, the local news-
paper, the Keokuk Constitution, began reporting about what it
considered "the absurdity of the sm.all-pox craze in Keokuk."
Recalling that this was not Keokuk's worst epidemic nor presum-
ably to be its m.ost deadly, the Constitution reminded citizens.
During the war there were a hundred or two cases of small-pox
in Keokuk much of the time; yet there was no stoppage of busi-
ness nor a general craze on the part of the citizens. . . . Formerly
scores of cases were treated in the pest house situated on the
bluffs within a himdred yards of town. Yet there was no such
alarm as the one which has prevailed in this city for the past ten
days. To-day there is more small-pox in central Iowa than in the
river towns, and more by long odds in some of our neighboring
cities than in Keokuk. . . . Keokuk has done noisily and to her
needless detriment what other cities have accomplished quietly,
effectually and without material loss.^ ^
Keokuk had no effective local health board in place to deal
with this epidemic, although the municipal code charged the
mayor and council with the responsibility. This was not unusual.
Keokuk had no board during the devastating cholera epidemic
of 1876, or during the recurrent smallpox epidemics of 1862-1864.
14. William J. Petersen, The Story of ¡owa: The Progress of an American State,
2 vois. (New York, 1952), 775-76; Transactions of the Iowa State Medical Society
6 (1883-85), 489-98.
15. Keokuk Constitution, 6 January 1882.
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Hastily, then, a local board of health was formed of city officials,
trustees, and physicians to issue proclamations quarantining all
those suspected of exposure to the disease. At the same time,
two local newspapers, the Keokuk Constitution and the Weekly
Gate-City were enlisted to salvage the city's image and economy.'^
Efforts of the Keokuk board came too late for the afflicted,
although its promotion of vaccination certainly protected many.
The board's first action—closing the medical college where the
disease originated—backfired. Since none of the students and
faculty at the institution lived in on-site dormitories, the gesture
was meaningless as a quarantine strategy. In fact, school closure
provided the excuse for "a stampede of the students" to their
homes in the tri-state area. Towns across the region bashed the
Keokuk board in the press for its inability to control the epi-
demic. The city council of the town of Warsaw, only five miles
from Keokuk warned its residents to "abstain from all communi-
cation with said city of Keokuk," and recommended that local
hotels turn away all "strangers or visitors" for the duration.*^
The board's vaccination efforts began with local schools,
and by January 16 the Keokuk Constitution reported that "the
little pretty white arms [of students] were scratched and muti-
lated in wholesale numbers." The board also assigned a physi-
cian to go house to house in each of four districts in the city
seeking voluntary vaccinations. They encountered unexpected
public resistance. "I s'pose you've come to vaccinate us," one
woman was quoted as saying, "And ye might jest as well go
away agin, for we won't have it." At one house a "colored
brother" refused vaccination because, according to him, a rela-
tive who had been vaccinated in Georgia died one month later
from the measles, so none of his family was ever going to be
vaccinated. At another house a young girl declined vaccination
for her brothers and sisters, saying, "The folks was all away
from home, sir, besides, they was all vaccinated last year, and
we had the small-pox when we lived in Missouri!" Others
16. Lee Anderson, Iowa Pharmacy, 1880-1905: An Experiment in Professionalism
(Iowa City, 1989), 15; Keokuk Weekly Gate-City, 5 January 1882; Keokuk Con-
stitution, 12 January 1882.
17. Keokuk Constitution, 6 January 1882.
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argued that American rights to freedom and independence
implied the right to refuse vaccination.^^
In response to such resistance, the board, in an open letter,
demanded that the public give vaccinators "courteous treat-
ment" and allow them to "enter into the work of vaccination
at once" as they were "using none other than bovine (animal)
virus of the purest quality." Although no penalties were drawn
up for noncompliance, the majority of Keokuk's population had
been vaccinated or revaccinated by the end of February. "The
common remark now is, 'don't touch my sore arm,'" reported
the Constitution}^
Efforts by the local board to promote vaccination and quar-
antine were further hampered when the medical college's offi-
cials insisted on reopening the school immediately and local
businessmen sought to minimize the impact on trade. The
pestering by officials of the medical college to restart classes as
soon as possible created a minor sensation, undermining efforts
by the local board to maintain control over the populace. "The
faculty of the medical college appears to be determined to open
that institution next Monday," complained the editor of the
Constitution, while the board of health is equally determined
that it shall not be. We trust the matter will be settled quietly,
as it should be." The competing factions eventually reached a
compromise, and following a thorough disinfection of the dis-
secting laboratory, the school reopened. On the first day of re-
sumed classes, the Constitution marked the occasion by describ-
ing the unapologetic pledge of the "medica, with sails spread
for a voyage across the Esculapian sea, [to] take proper pre-
cautions to avoid infected cadavers."^^
Shortly after the epidemic broke out, a Constitution headline
cogently summarized the worries of the business conununity:
"The Danger Line Already Passed—No Apprehension Felt on
the Part of the Physicians—Effect on Trade." In the wake of
the epidemic, Keokuk citizens wanted to snatch their economic
chestnuts from the fire. As long as there were reminders that
18. Ibid., 21 January 1882.
19. Ibid., 16 January 1882.
20. Ibid., 5, 14, 16 January 1882.
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smallpox raged in the city, business would remain stagnant, as
rural farmers, purveyors of merchandise, and river traffickers
refused to enter town. "The hotel registers begin to tell of the
effect the small-pox scare in this city is having on the outside
world," reported the Constitution. "The arrivals now are about
one-third the usual number." Worries about potential loss of
income caused the local press to begin noting instances of un-
fair quarantining against Keokuk. Finger-pointing put off one
resident of nearby Alexandria, Missouri, who denied a newspa-
per report that Alexandria merchants were placarding against
entry by Keokukians. "Our merchants themselves have been in
your city purchasing goods since the small-pox broke out and
people are here every day from your town."^^
Word of the epidemic spread quickly, and damage control
seemed to be the essential element in the townspeople's response.
Within a week of the first smallpox deaths, the New York Times
published a report of the "ravages of smallpox" afflicting Keokuk.
Local health board president D. B. Hillis responded to queries
by assuaging fears. "There is a limited number of cases confined
entirely to medical students, and there is as yet no assured
tendency to spread among citizens outside," reported Hillis.
"Every means is being taken to lead [sic] off the epidemic and
stamp it out, and with good hope of success." The local press
on numerous occasions attempted to reeducate misinformed
individuals who accepted unconfirmed stories as fact or who
wrongly condemned the local board's efforts. "All kinds of wild
and unfounded rumors still continue to exist," wrote the editor
of the Constitution two weeks into the siege, "the generally ac-
cepted one outside of the city being that there are forty cases
when there are only about ten."^
Whatever response was to be m.ade to the epidemic had to
come from local sources; the State Board of Health offered no
help. The state board instead spent most of the first three years
of its existence setting up a rudimentary system of gathering
information. It took two years alone to collect incomplete sta-
21. Keokuk Constitution, 5,6 January 1882; Keokuk Weekly Gate-City, 6 January 1882.
22. New York Times, 6 January 1882; Keokuk Constitution, 7 January 1882;
Keokuk Weekly Gate-City, 12 January 1882.
Smallpox 101
tistics on births, deaths, and marriages from Iowa's ninety-nine
counties for the single year of 1880.^ Later, use of telegraphy
greatly enhanced the board's ability to collect data speedily,
especially after it instructed county clerks to charge all commu-
nications to the board. But Keokuk offlcials handling the small-
pox epidemic of 1881-82 could not legitimize their efforts by ap-
pealing to a more objective outside body, nor did they wish to.
WITHIN FIVE YEARS, local authorities did begin using such
a resource, as they drew expertise from a state board devoted
to promoting public health. Remittent importations of smallpox
into rural Worth County fronx 1886 to 1904 illustrate how local
boards gradually yielded authority to the state board. The local
response also suggests that citizens perceived in the outbreaks
an outside threat to their way of life. Many times over the years,
new immigrants and travelers imported smallpox epidemics into
this rural community. At irregular intervals, dozens of people
fell ill from the disease, and a few lost their lives.^ *
Two smallpox epidemics in particular are significant in
describing disease fighting by both the local Worth County
boards and the state board. In response to a new local code
requiring that the state board be notified of all epidemic dis-
eases and noxious hazards, both physician D. S. More of North-
wood and the clerk of rural Barton Township in eastem Worth
County reported in July 1886 "a number of persons exposed"
to the contagion by a recently arrived German immigrant family.
In December 1899 a separate epidemic began, which authorities
traced to a street carnival in Albert Lea, Minnesota. One of the
fair-goers, it was reported, was "allowed to go about at large
in Northwood, with a small-pox rash broken out on his face and
all over his body for nearly forty-eight hours. "^ ^
23. Iowa State Board of Health, First Registration Report (Des Moines, 1883),
vii-viii. State Board Secretary R. J. Farquharson pointed out in the preface of
the report that the computed death rate for the state—6 per 1,000—was
highly unlikely considering that the "settled" state of Massachusetts reported
a rate three times as high.
24. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 43; Transactions ofthe Iowa State Medical Society 17
(1903-4), 215.
25. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 43; Worth County Index, 13 December 1899.
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Resistance from within the German-bom population to
measures taken by local officials justified the state board's
decision to step in and attempt to reestablish order during the
1886 epidemic. In response to reports from local officials, the
state board had wired the Barton Township clerk to "establish
vigorous quarantine of all small-pox cases and exposed persons,
and order and enforce general vaccination, to prevent spread
of disease, and obey rules of State Board." The same day the
Barton Township Board of Trustees wired back that all efforts
to secure compliance with their orders had been thwarted by
a popular challenge to their authority, and they did not know
how to deal with the "ten or fifteen exposed persons [who]
refuse to obey trustees." The Worth County Jndex recounted in
its first story on the epidemic in Barton Township, "The local
board quarantined the Dietrick and Brown families [where the
smallpox had first erupted], but were powerless to enforce their
orders, and the German minister of Grafton, as well as many
of the neighbors visited the sick daily and insisted that it was
not the small pox and there was nothing to fear."^ ^
At that point the state board and the county sheriff were
called in. The secretary of the state board reported that local
officials manifested "an earnest desire . . . to do all that was
necessary to get rid of the scourge, but they did not know what
to do. They were further embarrassed by the interference of
pretended physicians who pronounced the disease not small-
pox, and advised resistance to all orders of the local board."
Compounding the problems in maintaining quarantine regula-
tions and encouraging vaccination, the doctor hired to vaccinate
county residents skipped town and was not heard from for
many weeks thereafter. This doctor later sent his apologies,
claiming he had been hurriedly called away to investigate a
mysterious disease afflicting his own hometown. Another doctor
hired by the state board to treat smallpox cases in Barton Town-
ship was not allowed to return to his office in Northwood for
fear that he "would not know enough to properly disinfect
himself before leaving the infected houses. "^ ^
26. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 43; Worth County Index, 22 July 1886.
27. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 44; Worth County index, 22 July 1886.
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Under increasing pressure from the state board, local offi-
cials began arresting and prosecuting those who refused to obey
the quarantine. Two members of the Dietrick family were fined
twenty-five dollars each, while a similar case was remitted on
the grounds that the defendant was "a Dane who recently arrived
in this country and he was not sufficiently acquainted with the
language to understand that the town trustees had provided
means for furnishing all necessary supplies to the parties who
were quarantined." Clearly, the Index reported, township offi-
cials had shown that they "don't propose being trifled with."^
In 1899 rumors of a renewed outbreak of disease abounded
in Worth County. According to attending physician J. Herbert
Darey, "cries of 'Cuban itch,' 'Philippine itch,' 'chickenpox/
'ruin the holiday trade,' etc. were heard on all hands, till the
mayor, at the insistence of a number of the leading citizens,
did what I requested him to do on the start, viz:—request the
State Board of Health to send an expert to Northwood, to see
if it was really smallpox or not." State Board President J. C.
Schrader arrived from Iowa City in short order and concluded
that the cases in question were indeed smallpox, though of an
attenuated form. "This was the first case of smallpox Drs. Hurd,
Stixrud, and myself, had ever happened to see," Darey related
later, "and we were much encouragd [sic], and eased in our
minds, by Dr. Schrader's confirmation of our diagnosis." Resis-
tance to vaccination efforts in Silver Lake Township, "owing to
the statements of a physician in another town, who backed them
up in their obstinancy [sic]," were also overcome when reports
of the malady mailed to the board in Des Moines returned with
a commandment to quarantine for fear of smallpox.^
This fime the state board directed most of the actions of
local health boards. While aiding in the writing of an extensive
code concerning public health in Northwood, the state board
directly implemented quarantine and preventative measures to
stave off the virus. The board also encouraged county mayors
and aldermen to exercise their right to create local boards of
28. Worth County Index, 29 July 1886. The German family's name was spelled
Dietrick in the July 22 edition and Dietrich in the July 29 edition.
29. Transactions of the Iowa State Medical Society 18 (1904), 215-16.
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health where there were none. Local boards were also instructed
in the disinfection of homes and were legally empowered to
remove a "sick or infected person to a separate house, if it can
be done without damage to his health, and [to provide] nurses
and other assistance and supplies, which shall be charged to the
person himself, his parents or other person who may be liable
for his support, if able; otherwise at the expense of the county
to which he belongs." In tum, local authorities drew up a new
Northwood ordinance, which filled two pages in the Index and
included more than thirty sections concerning disease control,
burials, and penalties for defiance. Finally, a state law passed
in 1897 enabled the local Worth County boards to arrest those
inoculating with smallpox—which unlike cowpox vaccination
makes the individual a carrier of the disease—or knowingly
using public transportation while infected.^
The Index itself served to defuse panic as the smallpox ad-
vanced, dispelling wild speculation and providing constructive
information. "Now, don't be alarmed," announced one article.
"There is doubtless a light case of smallpox in this town. The
facts in the case we have gleaned from Dr. Darey, and those in
which the public has a legitimate interest are herewith given as
follows." Another issue assured readers, "You are in no danger
of catching smallpox by long distance telephone."^'
Darey also tumed the economic argument against treat-
ment on its head as he and others vaccinated 335 individuals
in Danville Center in 1899-1900. "The best method of overcom-
ing prejudiced and unreasonable objections to vaccination,"
wrote Darey, "was to state gladly that this virus is expensive
and hard to get." He would continue with words to this effect,
"And now Mr. Wiseman, if you would rather not have it used
on your family, Mr. Needit is very anxious to have it at once, as
he can ill afford the quarantine and the sickness, while you are
well to do and would not be seriously inconvenienced should the
sickness come." In about three days 90 per cent of these will
complain of unfair discrimination . . . making good the adage.
30. Laws oflowa (1880), chap. 151; Northwood Municipal Code, Ordinance No.
90 (1886); Code oflowa (1897), chap. 10.
31. Worth County Index, 7,14 December 1899.
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"When you leam which end of the pig the head is on you have
no trouble in driving ^^
ALTHOUGH officials in Worth County relied heavily on the
authority of the state board of health, the limits of the board's
intervention were apparent even at the turn of the century.
Those limits are demonstrated in a smallpox epidemic that
affected a wide area of southwest Iowa and eastem Nebraska
in 1898-99. The Fremont Democrat—published in Hamburg,
Iowa—portrayed in its stories a county under siege by an
invisible invader that threatened the econoxnic life of the city.
Blame for the debacle was placed squarely on its neighbor
across the Missouri River, Nebraska City, where smallpox had
gotten completely out of control. This epidemic revealed most
strikingly the inability of the local Fremont County boards to
control what had become an interstate problem.^^
The State Board of Health did offer its encouragement and
limited support as the epidemic threatened to engulf the state.
By the late 1890s, the board was waging war against disease on
a number of fronts. It was, for example, encouraging improve-
ments in sanitary and water systems and the development of
a new diphtheria vaccine. Epidemic outbreaks were reported
by wire directly to the board offices in Des Moines, then trans-
mitted to health officials and appointed district officials who
could benefit from the knowledge. During the smallpox epidemic
of 1898, the city clerk of Hamburg and local county boards of
health remained in constant contact with the state board, both
to warn of the possible spread of the epidemic and to solicit
opinion. The state board had offered indirect support to local
communities since the mid-1880s, but asserted vehemently that
its advice was "given for the benefit of local boards that they
may more fully understand their duty in the premises, and the
necessity for prompt and vigilant action." Thus, local boards
32. Transactions of the Iowa State Medical Society 18 (1904), 218.
33. Fremont Democrat, 18 November, 16 December 1898; Biennial Report 10
(1899), 100. The explosion in smallpox cases was blamed on Nebraska's State
Board of Health, which had run out of funds. See Nebraska City Daily Press
for 1898 and 1899.
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were charged with ultimate responsibility for ending smallpox
incursions. Educated by the state board, they were to prepare
carefully for epidemics and act judiciously when they struck.^
The Fremont County epidemic began in mid-November
1898, when Mrs. Samuel Townsend returned from a visit to a
married daughter in Nebraska City who was sick with an "erup-
tive fever, but not well defined." Although Mrs. Townsend was
only mildly affected herself, her family was quickly and seri-
ously infected. On November 18 the city clerk telegraphed the
state board to report the outbreak. He noted that the mayor had
appointed four police to guard the Townsend residence—"two
by night and two by day." The same afternoon, local physician
W. L. Bogan wired the state board to ask what additional steps
should be taken to stem the spread of the smallpox. "The local
board of health has the case quarantined, and we hope to pre-
vent the spread of the disease," wrote Bogan. "Any information
from you will be gladly received and duly appreciated by your
humble servant."~^^
The next day Hamburg's local press, the Fremont Democrat,
began reporting the course of the epidemic as it spread outward
from the Townsend family, and from a felled contract laborer
home from Nebraska City. The Democrat praised the mayor and
town physicians for their quick reaction to the disease and the
subsequent quarantine. The paper noted with concern, however,
that another of Mrs. Townsend's daughters had continued to
attend public school, much to the consternation of the teachers
and pupils. Further infection arrived by steady communication
across the railroad trestle bridging the Missouri. "We have
quarantined against Nebraska City, Neb., but we are unable to
place a quarantine at the bridge," lamented the city clerk in a
communication to the state board, "and we are in great danger
by people coming here from Nebraska City." He added, "Our
cases are all well. We don't want any more. . . . Please attend
to this i ^ ^
34. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 43.
35. Biennial Report 10 (1899), 100-101.
36. Fremont Democrat, 18 November 1898; Biejmial Report 10 (1899), 101.
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As alarm spread, other Fremont County communities began
to request the state board to step in and establish a more secure
quarantine against Nebraska City. J. A. Armstrong, Percival's
mayor and de facto local health board president, sent a telegram
to the state board, pleading, "A new disease has broken out in
our midst that is causing us lots of alarm, and the doctors do
not agree as to its character. Some call it smallpox and some do
not. . . . Will you please advise me what to do?" Two weeks
later, on Christmas Eve, Armstrong requested that the state
board draft men to guard the bridge spanning the Missouri.
"A great many people are daily passing from Iowa into Ne-
braska City for the purpose of trading," wrote the mayor. "Con-
sequently, we are very anxious to have guards stationed there."
Armstrong apologized that town officials were unable to stop
the trade, explaining that strict quarantine "would have been
done before now if our local board had understood the neces-
sary steps in the proceeding. . . . We shall be very glad to have
you take active measures at once."^^
Pleas received from officials in Hamburg, Percival, and rural
Fremont County townships prompted the state board to send
district physician Dr. McKlveen to report on the situation first-
hand and explain to county boards the principles of restricting
smallpox. McKlveen wrote to the chairman of the local board
at Percival, "asking if it would still, in their opinion, be neces-
sary for me to go up to their place, and they replied they thought
it would." After meeting with the local board and doctors, he
concluded that "the board at Percival seems to understand that
they have the full power of quarantine, but claim to lack the
means for doing it." The task was more formidable than either
the state board or McKlveen had anticipated. Not only would
they have to quarantine the railroad and wagon bridge that
connected Nebraska City with Iowa, but also miles of the river
bank as well, "as the river is frozen over and persons can cross
on the ice."^^
There were financial complications as well. "The [Percival]
board claimed to be willing to look after the quarantine," wrote
37. Biennial Report 10 (1899), 101-2.
38. Ibid., 103-4.
108 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
McKlveen, "but thought inasmuch as it was an interstate quar-
antine, the State should pay the expense," which they estimated
at about eight dollars per day. The state board was reluctant to
do so, however. Never before had the board earmarked money
directly for such activities. McKlveen doubted that the state even
had any funds for such purposes, but promised to write to the
governor about it. Percival's physician, M. L. Thomas, thought
that the state's failure to offer financial support could have
disastrous consequences. Although "local authorities here are
doing all in their power to stamp out this disease," he worried
that "they are becoming discouraged in their work. . . . I fear
if the State does not help in this matter this part of Iowa and
other parts of the State will have the greatest epidemic of small-
pox it has ever had, and will cost the State and counties a great
amount of money."^'
One of McKlveen's most important duties during his stay
in Fremont County was to disseminate information concerning
the prevention of smallpox. As the disease confinued into the
spring, instruction provided by McKlveen encouraged such
measures as vaccination and disinfection. McKlveen suggested
that all structures containing smallpox patients be thoroughly
fumigated, and the board issued a pamphlet recommending the
best means of fumigation. Their advice was followed through-
out the county. When two fresh cases of smallpox appeared in
Hamburg in May 1899, for example, a local doctor wrote that
"all doubtfiil clothing, bedding and draperies were burned. . . .
I had the stable and the horses disinfected, also the privy vault,
by using a solution of sulphate of iron and carbolic acid. I had
the yard raked and rubbish burned, then had the yard and
walks sprayed with solution of sulphate of iron." Moreover,
Bogan "had the parties all bathed, then washed in a solution
of carbolic acid and dressed in clean clothing. I had each room
fumigated with sulphur, cooled them off, and then used for-
maldehyde for six hours, opened the appartments [sic] and
thoroughly ventilated them, and moved the family in; con-
sidering there was no more danger." Although it is doubtful
that any of these tedmiques worked, they do illustrate the
39. Ibid., 104.
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degree to which local boards responded to the state board's
authority.*^
The Democrat appeared to view^ the disease with more equa-
nimity than had the Keokuk papers nearly twenty years earlier,
but it did decry the state of affairs in Nebraska City that had
caused the calamitous epidemic. "Now when the Democrat
stated some two weeks ago that there were cases of small-pox
in Nebraska City, the papers of that town stated emphatically
that the disease was not small-pox but merely chicken-pox/' the
paper reported. "They also published a statement in the Press
with the names of prominent physicians of that town signed to
it stating that there were no cases of small-pox in Nebraska City.
The fact is that the business men of Nebraska City concluded
that it would cause a stagnation of business in the town if they
allowed the report to be circulated that there were cases of this
dread disease in their city."*^
Fremont County residents were just as concemed as Nebraska
City merchants about protecting local trade. While condemning
Nebraska City's "smallpox situation" as "absolutely wretched,"
the disease was being perpetuated on the Iowa side by business
people intent on maintaining trade with the offending riverport.
The publisher of Hamburg's weekly religious newspaper, and
"one of our most law abiding ? citizens," found the quarantine
of little consequence. The Democrat strongly objected to his rec-
ommendation to a young schoolteacher that "she could slip over
to Nebraska City like he used to do when Hamburg was quar-
antined last month, and tha t . . . it would be alright." Still, the
paper itself was plainly complicit in understating the epidemic's
seriousness, for although the Hamburg clerk of court reported
twenty-seven cases to the state board for fiscal year 1898-99,
the newspaper mentioned only four cases directly. Wright's
Department Store, which bought advertising on the front page
of every issue of the weekly Democrat, insisted unabashedly in
their space in mid-February that "there is not a case of smallpox
in Hamburg and has not been for 4 weeks, and that there is no
40. Iowa State Board of Health, Restriction and Prevention of SmaU Pox (Des
Moines, 1881), 5-7; Fairchild, "Brief History," 480.
41. Fremont Democrat, 18 November 1898.
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quarantine against any of our neighbors." Although the com-
ment about the quarantine was true, the claim about smallpox
was patently false. Persons exposed to smallpox in Nebraska
City were in Hamburg nearly every day, and many cases un-
doubtedly went unreported for fear of inviting quarantine at
home or in a drafty building outside the city limits. Town
leaders quarantined against Nebraska City reluctantly, hoping
that this time the health board's edict would be obeyed. If not,
"Hamburg would soon have the seeds of the disease once more
sown in our city with the probable result of a serious seige [sic]
of sickness, business stagnation and an enormous expense in-
curred to the city and county."*^
Nebraska City citizens, in their turn, believed that the epi-
demic had started among the more than 2.5 million people who
attended the Trans-Missouri Exposition held between June 1 and
October 31,1898, in Omaha. Omaha's growing economic power
and its potential for incubating disease weighed heavily on the
minds of Nebraska City merchants who had watched their sales
dry up in the fall. When the fair's promoters proposed to res-
urrect the enterprise for 1899, seventy-seven Nebraska City
business owners lodged their protest by forming the Nebraska
Business Men's Protective Association and issuing a circular
letter to be published in newspapers across the state. The fair's
chief promoters, they complained, "seem to be aware of the fact
that there are still a few stray coins scattered over our state, and
what better plan could be adopted than to start an exposition
at public expense, gather in the stray coins and give nothing in
return." Amid talk of a possible boycott, word of smallpox in
Nebraska City prompted speculation that the Exposition was
directly to blame. Regardless of how the rumor started, it was
a useful claim when advanced by the Protective Association.
The dual threat of potential economic ruin and smallpox proved
an effective argument for the association. Another Exposition
was never
42. Ibid., 3, 24 February 1899.
43. Kenneth Gerald Alfers, "The Trans-Ms. Exposition" (M.A. thesis, Creighton
University, 1968), 124,133; Nebraska City News. 29 November, 13,16 December
1898.
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THE HAMBURG-NEBRASKA CITY EPIDEMIC of 1898-99
probably arrived via a Missouri River steamboat. There was,
however, an even more disquieting way for smallpox to enter
the state. Iowa's Board of Health recognized that passenger rail
travel, and especially the immigrants aboard the trains, carried
the potential to spread disease. The board documented cases of
immigrants, travelers, or hobos infecting Iowa commurûties (see
table 2). Many articles in the public health journals and news-
papers of the period lamented the double-edged sword of rail-
roads and disease. The secretary of Iowa's board worried about
the lack of control over this moving menace. "A great deal is
being said about the commercial value of railroads," he noted,
"and yet they have a sanitary value hardly less important." As
local Iowa communities drew life-blood from railroads that had
given birth to them, so also did they suffer from the railroads'
occasionally deadly cargo. Rural towns were much less likely
to refuse trains than for railroad companies to refuse service to
towns suffering localized epidemics. The state board made nu-
merous attempts to reduce the risk, but most were imperfect,
ill conceived, or simply not in the best interests of the railroads.
Still, encouraged by state and national boards of health, the
railroads made efforts to vaccinate employees, disinfect passen-
ger cars, and selectively forbid passage to those with obvious
cases of disease.**
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century
nearly all of Iowa's trunk rail lines originated in Chicago,
where even after the city established a full-time municipal
board of health in 1867, smallpox continued to trouble the city.
Serious epidemics occurred in 1872 and 1882, and deaths from
smallpox were recorded in all but five years from 1867 to 1900.
Chicago's celebrated 1893 Columbian Exhibition became a
magnet for infected visitors, necessitating the construction of a
new smallpox hospital. In the three years after the opening of
the fair, 3,754 cases of the disease were reported to Dr. Garrett,
Chicago's chief medical inspector. Defending the healthfulness
of the city, Garrett reported to the local board of health, "We
44. Bulletin ofthe Iowa State Board of Health 3 (1889), 6-8; Anderson, "'Head-
lights upon Sanitary Medicine,'" 192, 195; Biennial Report 1 (1881), 9-13, 16.
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were able in every instance to trace the source of the contagion
to other countries."^^
More than a decade earlier, the increasing number of small-
pox cases in Chicago had prompted a special meeting of the
Chicago Board of Health and other midwestem health boards.
Conferees at this Chicago Smallpox Conference in 1881 included
Iowa State Board Secretary R. J. Farquharson; officials from the
new but ill-fated National Board of Health; state board repre-
sentatives from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, and Michigan;
and local board members from Chicago, Milwaukee, Buffalo,
and Baltimore. Participants at the conference urged health or-
ganizations to take care in quarantining and vaccinafing their
populafions. "In view of the fact of the frequent introduction
of small-pox into the interior of Iowa from immigrants," said
Secretary Farquharson, "the Iowa State Board of Health would
respectfully request the National Board of Health to secure the
vaccination of all unprotected immigrants before they leave the
ports of arrival in this country." Some conferees denounced the
feeble efforts made by eastem ports to prevent diseases from
propagating. Others complained that midwestem termini were
becoming dumping grounds for sick immigrants.*^
The Chicago Smallpox Conference and the pleas of mid-
western public health authorities drew a response from the
recently created National Board of Health, which created a
special Immigration Inspection Service in June 1882 to check
railroads, ocean steamers, and river transport for disease.
Doctors were hired across the nation to inspect and vaccinate
immigrants and travelers. From the start, though, the Immi-
gration Inspection Service was ineffective in stemming the
flow of disease across the Atlantic and from east to west.
Inadequate numbers of inspectors were overwhelmed by the
task; Chicago had only five physicians at its disposal, St. Louis
45. Rawlings, Rise and Fall of Disease in Illinois, 313-16. The only years be-
tween the founding of the Chicago Board of Health in 1867 and the turn of
the century in which there were no reported deaths from smallpox were 1888,
1890,1891,1896, and 1898. Mortality averaged 167 per year from 1867 to 1900,
with a high of 1,292 in 1882 and a total for the period of 5,535.
46. Rawlings, Rise and Fall of Disease in Illinois, 105,145-48; Biennial Report 1
(1881), 167-69; ibid. 3 (1885), 46.
114 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
and Indianapolis only two. An inspector proposed for Omaha
was never funded.'*^
The Immigration Inspection Service had little immediate
impact, but its existence had important ramifications. It con-
tributed to the sense that "every organized commxmity should
be provided with a competent board of health, and the State
with a State Board, supplied with every requisite for aiding
and directing the local authorities in their sanitary work."
More importantly, though, for a short time the Immigration
Inspection Service was a visible reminder that disease was
more than a local phenomenon, one that demanded coordinated
efforts, and it provided a national forum for discussing ways
to combat the health problems related to integrated, global
transportation systems. In 1883, as the service was being phased
out due to budget cuts and political infighting, sixteen local
and state boards, including Iowa's, submitted a blanket recom-
mendation to the National Board pleading for its continuation.
The signers agreed that the service was necessary "to prevent
the frequent introduction of smali-pox and other contagious
disease among the people of this country." Admitting their
own inadequacy in meeting the epidemic threat, these boards
noted that "this inspection service is such that its benefits have
no relation to State boundaries, but its protective influences
extend widely throughout this country; consequently, expenses
therefore should not properly be borne by any local or State
board of health."'«
47. Ralph C. Williams, The United States Public Health Service, 1798-1950
(Washington, DC, 1951), 76-79; Report ofthe National Board of Health (1883),
125-46. The National Board of Health lasted only six years (1879-1885).
Overwhelmed by the scope of the problems it was to handle and besieged
by political turmoil, its financial support was revoked by a Congress that
expressed dissatisfaction with the board's lack of success in creating a more
healthful American environment. The board was already operating on a
shoestring budget when a costly yellow fever epidemic in Pensacola, Florida,
in 1882 sealed its financial doom. The best history of the National Board of
Health is Peter W. Bruton, "The NaHonal Board of Health" (Ph.D. diss.
University of Maryland, 1974).
48. Rawlings, Rise and Fall of Disease in Illinois, 145-46; Biennial Report 3 (1885),
46; ibid. 1 (1881), 169; Annual Report ofthe National Board of Health (1883), 19.
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Although state veterinary surgeons had drawn up lengthy
regulations to certify the health of cattle coming from areas
where disease was plentiful, few similar laws were on the books
for humans until the 1890s. The Immigration Inspection Service
and the Iowa State Board of Health spurred Iowa rail companies
to detain passengers who had obvious symptoms of smallpox,
were incapacitated by dysentery, or were suffering from un-
diagnosed fevers. Iowa railroad Stationmasters responded by
disinfecting passenger cars just prior to their use. General Man-
ager Marvin Hughitt of the Chicago & North Western Railway
Company ordered his employees and officers to inspect "pas-
senger coaches, and especially those used for the transportation
of seaboard emigrants" and make sure they were "thoroughly
cleaned throughout" after every run.^ ^ In 1894 management
for the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway issued a cir-
cular making it the "duty of conductors to report by wire to
their superintendents and the secretary of the State Board of
Health any person on their train suspected of having small pox
or cholera." Station agents were to report to the local board of
health the arrival of all immigrants so that the board could in-
spect the immigrants and their baggage. Still, economic concerns
prevented the national and state boards from^ demanding reform
from railroad companies. National board physician Stephen
Smith announced, for example, that "trains need not be delayed
for the inspection may go on while the train is moving."™
The Chicago & North Western Railway epidemic of June
1889 provides an example of the rail-borne vector for smallpox
in Iowa. The epidemic spread virtually from one end of the
state to the other, although only two exposed individuals died.
Imported among German immigrants aboard a crowded passen-
49. Biennial Report 4 (1887), 66-67; ibid. 3 (1885), 47-48. In 1897 stockmen
organized the Interstate United States Livestock Sanitary Association, which
dealt specifically with the infectious diseases and nutrition of animals. The
association's Proceedings reveal that conferees were nearly as well informed
as public health officials. See, for example, the floor debate on horse glanders
at the 1904 aruiual meeting in Denver, Colorado, in Proceedings of the Seventh
Annual Meeting of the Interstate Association of Live Stock Sanitary Boards 7 (1904),
66-67.
50. Biennial Report 8 (1895), 17; ibid. 2 (1883), 24.
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ger train, smallpox pustules were apparent on the face of one
immigrant as the train entered the state. Nevertheless, no action
was taken until stations along the route began complaining by
telegraph to the state board. Clinton, Marshalltown, Nevada,
Boone, and Jefferson each charged that smallpox had made its
appearance in their connmurüties coincidentally with the arrival
of the train, leaving sickness in its tracks. Apparently, none of
the station managers bothered to wire ahead and spare the next
town. When the state board requested that exposed passengers
be taken into protective custody, the mayor of Wall Lake in Sac
County refused, saying that the board had to remove them from
the community. The train was then sent on its way. At Galva,
obstructions placed on the tracks forced the train to stop. The
train was then moved onto a siding, and state board physician
J. D. Miller quarantined the passengers and crew. The caboose
in which the infected passenger had been riding was dragged
to an Ida County gravel pit, where it was disinfected and aban-
doned. Regarding such problems as this. Secretary Farquharson
was prompted to write, "Something more is required than the
inspection and vaccination of passengers." Farquharson advo-
cated the total isolation of immigrants on their journeys, sealed
in their own cars as they crossed the state. That way, hapless
lowans need not suffer because "immigrants are mixed up with
the passengers."^'
True controls for diseases required immigrant inspection
at the national border, which suggested federal authority. "If
a proper examination of European imn:iigrants was made at
the point of embarkation, and the unvaccinated ones properly
vaccinated," noted Secretary Farquharson, "there would be
but little need of any inspection afterward on the railroads."
National Board of Health physician Stephen Smith responded,
"Your suggestion is the one that the National Board has been
acting upon, but in every attempt it has failed owing to defects
in the law. It cannot enforce vaccination, either at foreign ports
or home ports under existing ^^
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Finally, in 1891 Congress ruled that immigrants were to be
screened both for pestilential diseases and epilepsy as well as
for their moral character. That legislation did not remove the
immigrant vector for disease, but it did lessen it substantially.
The widening scope of activity by the United States PubUc
Health Service also limited the extraterritorial introduction of
disease into Iowa and the nation. Facilities for quarantine of
vessels were constructed at significant points of entry each year
until detention stations were in operation at every major seaport
and border crossing in the nation."
CONCERN ABOUT SMALLPOX slowly weakened as the
turn of the century approached, not because of the activities of
health organizations, but because V. minor replaced V. major as
the main type of infection. Mild cases of the disease were
already present in Iowa by the 1880s, and were often confused
with chickenpox. Still, they could elicit panic. "All cases of
chicken-pox during the prevalence of small-pox in any part of
the coun-try should be regarded with the greatest possible
doubt and suspicion," warned Secretary Farquharson. "An error
of diagnosis is frequently followed by grave consequences." Des
Moines adopted a siege mentality when two young boys and
three girls in two families were incorrectly identified as exhibit-
ing small-pox in 1892. Although the children began recovering
within the week, the physician employed by the board of health
to attend the children "stoutly maintained that the disease was
small pox and urged the board not to release the quarantine."
Three more weeks passed before the quarantine was lifted. "It
seems incredible," state board physician E. H. Carter wrote later,
"that in the city of Des Moines, two families should have been
taken from their homes, placed in a pest house, guarded by
officers and kept there for nearly a month during the develop-
ment of six or eight well marked cases of chicken
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Increased incidence of the weaker strain of smallpox modified
atfitudes toward the disease soon after the tum of the century.
One unusual, though worthless, response was the popularization
of "red light" treatments for smallpox sufferers. The treatment,
called "erythrotherapy" by its developer, Dubuque physician
J. C. Hancock, employed natural light diffused with a red screen
purportedly to reduce the unpleasant scarring of the face and
body that accompanied an attack. Concem about scarring had
been of little consequence in previous centuries, when mortality
had been very high.^ ^
By the tum of the century, the changing nature of smallpox
had a similar effect on the state board's approach to the disease.
Instead of stressing its mortal effect, the board issued posters
and other pamphlet material designed to portray those who
refused vaccination as uneducated, and those who suffered the
disease as threats to society.^ ^
In the preceding decades the Iowa State Board of Health
had added a new voice to the debate over the relationship
between epidenüc disease, immigrants, and the marketplace.
However, the board could do little to prevent the further spread
of smallpox but share its expertise and lend its authority to
encouraging the use of the cowpox vaccine and the quarantine
of exposed persons. Only the proliferation of a mild strain of
the virus, not the recognized efforts of the Iowa State Board of
Health, worked to stem the public panic long associated with
smallpox.
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